Why Does the Cognitive Reflection Test (Sometimes) Predict Utilitarian Moral Judgment (and Other Things)? by Baron, Jonathan et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Finance Papers Wharton Faculty Research
9-2015
Why Does the Cognitive Reflection Test
(Sometimes) Predict Utilitarian Moral Judgment
(and Other Things)?
Jonathan Baron
University of Pennsylvania
Sydney Scott
Katrina Marie Fincher
University of Pennsylvania
S. Emlen Metz
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/146
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Baron, J., Scott, S., Fincher, K. M., & Metz, S. E. (2015). Why Does the Cognitive Reflection Test (Sometimes) Predict Utilitarian
Moral Judgment (and Other Things)?. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 4 (3), 265-284. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.09.003
Why Does the Cognitive Reflection Test (Sometimes) Predict Utilitarian
Moral Judgment (and Other Things)?
Abstract
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is thought to correlate with measures of utilitarian moral judgment
because it measures system-2 correction of an initial intuitive response. And some theories of moral judgment
hold that the same thing often happens when people arrive a utilitarian judgments. We find, however, that
CRT-type items (using logic as well as arithmetic) can work just as well when they do not have obvious
intuitive answers at predicting utilitarian moral judgment, assessed with self-report questionnaires as well as
with hypothetical scenarios, and also at predicting a measure of actively open-minded thinking (AOT).
Moreover, long response times, as well as high accuracy, also predict moral judgment and other outcomes. The
CRT might thus be considered a test of reflection-impulsivity (RI). However, RI is only part of AOT, because
RI is concerned only with the amount of thinking, not its direction. Tests of AOT also predict utilitarian
moral judgments. Individual differences in AOT and moral judgments are both strongly (negatively)
associated with belief that morality comes from God and cannot be understood through thought. The
correlation of CRT and utilitarian judgment, when found, is thus likely due to the (imperfect) correlation of
AOT and CRT. Intuition in these domains is thus not necessarily something that people overcome through
additional thinking, but rather what they rely on when they do not think very much.
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The  Cognitive  Reﬂection  Test  (CRT)  is  thought  to  correlate  with  measures  of  utilitarian  moral  judgment
because  it  measures  system-2  correction  of an initial  intuitive  response.  And  some  theories  of moral
judgment  hold that the same  thing  often  happens  when  people  arrive  a utilitarian  judgments.  We  ﬁnd,
however,  that  CRT-type  items  (using  logic  as well  as  arithmetic)  can  work  just as well  when  they  do
not have  obvious  intuitive  answers  at  predicting  utilitarian  moral  judgment,  assessed  with  self-report
questionnaires  as  well  as with  hypothetical  scenarios,  and  also  at predicting  a measure  of actively  open-
minded  thinking  (AOT).  Moreover,  long  response  times,  as  well  as high  accuracy,  also predict  moral
judgment  and other  outcomes.  The  CRT  might  thus  be  considered  a  test  of  reﬂection-impulsivity  (RI).
However,  RI  is only  part  of  AOT, because  RI is  concerned  only  with  the amount  of  thinking,  not  its  direc-
tion.  Tests  of  AOT  also  predict  utilitarian  moral  judgments.  Individual  differences  in AOT  and  moral
judgments  are  both  strongly  (negatively)  associated  with  belief  that morality  comes  from  God  and  can-
not be understood  through  thought.  The  correlation  of  CRT and  utilitarian  judgment,  when  found,  is thus
likely  due to the  (imperfect)  correlation  of  AOT  and  CRT.  Intuition  in  these  domains  is thus  not  necessarily
something  that  people  overcome  through  additional  thinking,  but rather  what  they  rely  on  when  they
do  not  think  very  much.
©  2014  Society  for Applied  Research  in Memory  and  Cognition.  Published  by Elsevier  Inc.  This  is an
open  access  article under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The sequential two-system theory of judgment—also called the
“default interventionist” theory (Evans, 2007)—holds that many
cognitive tasks involve a fast, intuitive, process, followed some-
times by a slower and more reﬂective process that often corrects
errors resulting from the intuitive process (Kahneman, 2011). The
 Study 1 was based on a course project in a class with four students, who partici-
pated in its design: Antonios N. Cotaias, Razeen Jivani, Matthew H. Lazarus, and Brett
D.  Neustadt. An earlier version of this paper contained a report of data collected by
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standing any copyright annotation thereon. Disclaimer: The views and conclusions
expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessar-
ily  representing the ofﬁcial policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied,
of IARPA, DoI/NBC, or the U.S. Government..
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intuitive judgment is immediate and does not result from effortful
thought beyond what is required to understand the task. A great
deal of evidence supports this account in a number of domains (e.g.,
Evans, 2003; Galotti, Baron, & Sabini, 1986; Johnson-Laird & Bara,
1984; Kahneman, 2011). And other evidence is at least consistent
with this account elsewhere.
The CRT is a small set of math problems with misleading intu-
itive answers (lures). Thus, correct answers are thought to require
overcoming an initial intuitive response. The CRT correlates with
many other measures (e.g., Toplak & Stanovich, 2002). Researchers
often assume that the reason for these correlations is that the other
measures also involve overcoming an initial intuitive answer, and
the correlation is the result of the disposition to overcome intuition.
Here we address this assumption by asking why  the CRT correlates
with other measures. Note that the CRT could indeed require over-
coming intuition but could also be sensitive to other dispositions,
and these other dispositions could account for its predictive power.
The main task we use for asking this question is moral dilemmas
that involve a conﬂict between a rule-based prohibition of some
type of action and a utilitarian evaluation of overall consequences,
e.g., killing one person to save ﬁve. It is often argued that the utilitar-
ian response requires overcoming the intuitive response based on
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.09.003
2211-3681/© 2014 Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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the prohibition. And researchers have found correlations between
the CRT and utilitarian responding, as we discuss later.
As a secondary validation task, in addition to utilitarian judg-
ments, we looked at correlations with a self-report measure of
actively open-minded thinking (AOT), assessed as a belief that it
is good to question initially favored conclusions.
We present evidence that individual differences in these tasks
do not involve differences in the disposition to overcome an initial
intuition while thinking about a judgment. Rather, if there are dif-
ferences in intuition vs. reﬂection, they may  exist from the outset
of a judgment task.
In the course of this project, we expanded the CRT in two ways,
ﬁrst by adding verbal items as well as arithmetic items, and, second,
by adding items without lures. The items without lures were for the
purpose of asking whether lures were necessary for correlations
with other measures and items.
1.1. The Cognitive Reﬂection Test (CRT)
The CRT (Frederick, 2005) has proven to be one of the most
useful measures in the study of individual differences in think-
ing, judgments, and decisions. To take a few examples, it shows
substantial correlations with common biases in judgments and
decisions (Campitelli & Labollita, 2010; Toplak & Stanovich, 2002),
utilitarian moral judgments (Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2011), dis-
belief in God and the supernatural (Gervis & Norenzayan, 2012;
Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Shenhav,
Rand, & Greene, 2011), and leniency of moral condemnation in the
absence of harm (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang,
2014). For a three-item test, it is highly reliable, with reliability
coefﬁcients (Cronbach’s ˛) around.6 for most samples.
The three arithmetic items used in the test (items Af1–3 in
Table 1) are designed to have intuitive but incorrect answers, which
must be over-ridden in order to reach the correct answer. They
are trick problems. They thus measure a crucial property of the
two-systems of reasoning (Evans, 2003; Kahneman, 2011), the will-
ingness to check or question an initial answer and change it. Many
psychologists, perhaps beginning with Selz (1935), have argued
that this disposition is a crucial property of rational thinking and
even of intelligence (Baron, 1985). Various forms of two-systems
theory have been criticized for lumping together, in one system or
another, properties that are imperfectly correlated (e.g., Keren &
Schul, 2009). Yet the distinction between immediate and natural
responses, on the one hand, and reﬂective responses, on the other,
seems clear and relevant to many questions about reasoning and
judgment (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).
1.2. The sequential two-system view of moral judgment
Many approaches to moral judgment have relied on various
sorts of two-systems, or two-levels theory, a lower one and a higher
one. The lower system is, by various accounts, automatic, unre-
ﬂective, driven by emotion (or affect), based on associations rather
than rules, and undemanding on limited cognitive resources. The
higher system is the opposite, and is sometimes said to kick in only
after the lower system has produced a tentative judgment, as in the
sequential theory discussed here.
In Greene’s version (e.g., Greene, 2009; Greene, Morelli,
Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008) system-1 is fast, automatic
and effortless, while system-2 requires effortful thinking. Greene
also proposes that system-1 is inﬂuenced by emotional responses,
more than system-2. Thus, in a dilemma such as the fat-man ver-
sion of the trolley problem—in which subjects need to say whether
it is appropriate to push a man  off a bridge so that his body stops a
runaway trolley headed toward ﬁve people, thus killing the man  to
save ﬁve others—people have an immediate, automatic emotional
Table 1
Items used in the studies reported here, with citations after each, or each group.
Answers are in the footnote at the end of the paper.
Belief bias items with lures (inconsistent answers)
Bl1. All ﬂowers have petals.
Roses have petals.
If these two statements are true, can we conclude
from them that roses are ﬂowers.
Bl2. All mammals walk.
Whales are mammals.
If these two statements are true, can we conclude
from them that whales walk.
Bl3. All things that have a motor need oil.
Automobiles need oil.
If these two statements are true, can we conclude
from them that automobiles have a motor.
Bl4. All living things need water.
Roses need water.
. . .,  can we conclude from them that roses are
living things. (Markovits & Nantel, 1989)
Bl5. All vehicles have wheels.
Boats are vehicles.
.  . .,  can we conclude from them that boats have
wheels. (De Neys & Franssens, 2009)
Syllogisms
S1. In a box, some red things are square, and some square things
are large. What can we conclude?
Some red things are large.
All red things are large.
We  can’t conclude anything about red things and
large things.
S2. In a box, no green things are round, and all round things are
large. What can we  conclude?
No green things are large.
Some green things are not large.
We  can’t conclude anything about green things
and large things.
S3. In a box, no blue things are triangular, and no triangular things
are  large. What can we conclude?
No blue things are large.
Some blue things are not large.
We  can’t conclude anything about blue things and
large things. (based on Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984)
Original arithmetic items (Frederick)
Af1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more
than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
Af2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long
would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
Af3.  In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the
entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half
of the lake? (Frederick, 2005)
New arithmetic items with lures
Al2. If it takes 2 nurses 2 minutes to measure the blood pressure of
2  patients, how long would it take 200 nurses to measure the
blood pressure of 200 patients?
Al1. Soup and salad cost $5.50 in total. The soup costs a dollar more
than the salad. How much does the salad cost?
Al3. Sally is making sun tea. Every hour, the concentration of the
tea doubles. If it takes 6 hours for the tea to be ready, how long
would it take for the tea to reach half of the ﬁnal
concentration? (Finucane & Gullion, 2010).
Other items
O1. Jack is looking at Anne but Anne is looking at George. Jack is
married but George is not. Is a married person looking at an
unmarried person?
(A) Yes (B) No (C) Cannot be determined. (Toplak &
Stanovich, 2002; see also Böckenholt (2012))
O2. Ann’s father has a total of ﬁve daughters: Lala, Lele, Lili, Lolo,
and . What is the name of the ﬁfth daughter? (Krizo, 2011,
but apparently older.)
O3. On the side of a boat hangs a ladder with six rungs. Each rung
is  one foot from the next one, and the bottom rung is resting
on the surface of the water. The tide rises at a rate of one foot
an  hour. How long will take the water to reach the top rung?
5  hours, 6 hours, never (Edward Royzman, personal
communication)
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response to the idea of pushing a man  to his death, and this leads
them to want to say that it would be wrong to do so. Then, some
people will reﬂect before they make this response, using system-2,
and decide that they would not want to let ﬁve others die through
their inaction. Several lines of evidence support this theory, yet
questions can be raised about each one, particularly about whether
the two systems operate sequentially.
First, response times (RTs) for “personal” dilemmas like the fat-
man  are longer, especially when subjects endorse the utilitarian
option. Baron, Gürc¸ ay, Moore, and Starcke (2012) argue that this
result can be explained in terms of conﬂict. When choices are dif-
ﬁcult, so that the subject is as likely to respond yes as no, RT is
long. (Most subjects responding “no” to the fat-man have fast RTs.)
According to the two-system theory, in these difﬁcult cases, “yes”
responses should still take longer than “no” responses, because yes
responses require an extra step. This result is not found.
Second, cognitive interference increases RT of utilitarian
responses but not RT of deontological (non-utilitarian, rule-based)
responses (Greene et al., 2008). The dilemmas in question typically
involve performing a forbidden action to kill one person in order
to save some number of others from being killed, and the num-
ber of others may  affect whether the subjects decide that action
is permissible. The interfering task, however, involved arithmetic.
This might have slowed down utilitarian responses because they
required processing the numbers. Also, the deontological response
could be based on a less thorough reading of the dilemma, consid-
ering only the type of action to be taken and not the number saved.
The numbers are necessary to make a normally immoral action
seem morally reasonable.
Third, Suter and Hertwig (2011) reported that instructing
people to go fast or slow affected their responses. They found
that three dilemmas classiﬁed as “personal high-conﬂict” yielded
fewer utilitarian responses under time pressure than ﬁve “imper-
sonal” dilemmas, yet one of their two “personal low-conﬂict”
items yielded just as much conﬂict (distance from 50% utilitar-
ian responding) in both of their experiments and was affected in
the opposite direction. In general, re-analysis of their data (which
they kindly provided), suggests that their reported results could be
attributed to idiosyncratic properties of the three personal high-
conﬂict dilemmas that they used. Gürc¸ ay and Baron (in preparation,
and available on request) discuss the details of this re-analysis, and
report failure to ﬁnd any effect of time pressure in two  studies.1
Fourth, utilitarian responding correlates with cognitive reﬂec-
tion as a trait (e.g., Paxton et al., 2011). Cognitive reﬂection is
measured by the CRT, which consists problems with intuitive
answers that turn out to be incorrect, thus apparently requiring
correction of a system-1 response by system-2 (Frederick, 2005).
This is a more interesting result, but a correlation like this does not
imply that correction is involved in the moral judgment task, or
even in the CRT itself. A person who is not distracted by the trick
answers in the arithmetic test might just adopt an attitude of using
system-2 from the outset, analyzing each problem without even
being tempted to take a guess at the answer. Similarly, in moral
judgment, people may  set out to look at all the information, includ-
ing side effects of doing nothing, before even making a tentative
judgment.
1.3. Reﬂection-impulsivity (RI)
More generally, a correlation between the CRT and utilitarian
judgment could result from individual differences in reﬂection-
1 In addition, (Trémoliere, De Neys, & Bonnefon, 2012), Experiment 2, also report
an  effect of load, but they do not provide sufﬁcient details to determine whether
this effect is consistent across items.
impulsivity (RI), a measure of cognitive style concerned with the
relative preference for accuracy (reﬂection) versus speed (impulsi-
vity). RI was  ﬁrst studied in children (Kagan, Rosman, Day, Albert, &
Phillips, 1964; Messer, 1976) in particular perceptual tasks involv-
ing visual matching. Children who were higher in both accuracy and
time spent, compared to those who were less accurate and faster,
tended to be better students, and they excelled in other ways. Baron,
Badgio, and Gaskins (1986), in a study of pre-adolescent children,
argued that the concept could be deﬁned more generally so that it
applied to any task that required thinking, and we used logic and
arithmetic tasks to assess it. The deﬁnition that we suggested, and
that will be used here, was  to convert accuracy and log response
time (RT) to standardized (z) scores and add them. We  used the log
of RT, taken for each response before averaging, in order to pre-
vent extremely long times from having a disproportionate weight.
Cokely & Kelley (2009) have suggested the CRT could serve as a
measure of reﬂection-impulsivity (RI), and we  present evidence
here for this suggestion. Correlations between the CRT and other
measures could arise because it measures RI, whatever else it might
measure. If so, then RT, as well as accuracy, should predict other
measures.
This kind of explanation is not far from Greene’s two-system
account, but it does not assume any sequential effects involving
suppressing an early response by a late one, so it is thus consistent
with the results described so far, and with versions of two-systems
theory that assume that the systems work in parallel rather than
sequentially (e.g., Sloman, 1996). It is clear by any account that
people differ in some sort of reﬂectiveness, and these differences
are related to differences in at least some moral dilemmas.
However, other factors could affect the observed correlations
between the CRT and utilitarian judgment, such as acquired reli-
gious beliefs, a topic we  explore later.
1.4. Actively open-minded thinking (AOT) vs. myside bias
The willingness to question initial intuitive answers is also an
element of “actively open-minded thinking” (AOT, Baron, 2008), as
suggested by Campitelli and Labollita (2010). AOT  is a set of dis-
positions aimed at avoiding “myside bias”, the tendency to think
in ways that strengthen whatever possible conclusions are already
strong. Various manifestations of myside bias occur in both search
and inference. In search, people seek evidence supporting a favored
conclusion and fail to seek alternative conclusions or evidence
against their favorite, or to seek goals that it does not serve. In
inference, evidence against a favored conclusion is given too lit-
tle weight. Myside bias manifests itself in several well-studied
phenomena, such as polarization (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), belief
overkill (Baron, 2009), and predecisional distortion (Chaxel, Russo,
& Kerimi, 2013).
Individuals differ in measures of myside bias (e.g., Baron, 1995;
Stanovich & West, 1998). These differences seem to result in part
from differences in beliefs about how thinking should be con-
ducted. People with less myside bias (or none) think that they
should question initial conclusions, while other people think that
they should not question their prior beliefs (Baron, 1995; Sa, West,
& Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2007). In these studies, beliefs
about good thinking were measured by self-report questionnaires,
and myside bias was  measured with tasks that assessed thinking
directly.
Here we  ask whether correlations between CRT and utilitarian
judgment (when they occur) result from the fact that both the CRT
and utilitarian judgment are correlated with AOT, as assessed by a
short self-report questionnaire about beliefs. We  ﬁnd support for
this possibility. In addition, given that the CRT correlates with AOT,
we can use this fact to validate verbal CRT items and items without
lures.
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1.5. New CRT items
In the course of the research reported here, we sought to expand
the CRT, and it seems that we were successful in this aim. Frederick
(2005) published the three items, and other authors have done the
same. The original three items are increasingly familiar to people
who have been subjects in psychology experiments (done on the
World Wide Web, college classrooms, or elsewhere) and even to
readers of news articles about psychology. Ultimately, they will lose
some of their predictive power through repeated use. The items
might also be somewhat unrepresentative of items of the general
type (trick problems) because they all involve arithmetic. Women
do worse on these items than men  (Frederick, 2005), but this may
simply be another instance of the common ﬁnding that men  do
better on mathematical tests while women do better on verbal tests
(Reilly, 2012). Extension of the CRT to verbal items might increase
its representativeness.
In Studies 3–5, we also test (and describe) extensions of the CRT
to items without intuitive lures. We  intend these items as experi-
ments to understand why the CRT correlates with other measures,
but not yet as possible extensions for general use. In these stud-
ies, we examine correlations with a measure of AOT as well as with
moral judgment. We  ﬁnd that correlations with AOT are just as high
without the lures as with them.
The new items with lures are shown in Table 1. Those beginning
with B are belief-bias items used in studies inspired most directly
by the work of Evans, Barston, and Pollard (1983), although the
basic effect was known much earlier (e.g., Janis & Frick, 1943). Peo-
ple tend to judge the validity of logical syllogisms according to the
truth of their conclusions. This is a natural response that must be
over-ridden (Evans, 2003). A disadvantage of these items is that the
incorrect answer could result from poor system-2 reasoning rather
than from acceptance of the system-1 result. Unlike the original
CRT items, we cannot distinguish these possibilities by looking at
which errors were made. But the evidence for a two-system view of
these items is strong (e.g., De Neys, 2006), so we use them anyway.
Moreover, Toplak, West, and Stanovich (2013) found that 8 belief-
bias items correlated.55 with the original CRT,.48 with a set of four
arithmetic items like the original CRT, which, in turn, correlated.58
with the original CRT. We  would expect that the arithmetic items
would have slightly higher correlations with each other because
they draw on speciﬁc mathematical knowledge; but, aside from
this, it seems arguable that the belief-bias items should measure
the same trait.
Those beginning with S are categorical syllogisms. Johnson-
Laird and Bara (1984); and also Galotti et al. (1986) convincingly
argue that such syllogisms are solved by a process much like the
distinction made in the two-systems theory. According to their
“mental models” theory, people ﬁrst put together a single model
that combines the information from the two premises. Some people
stop there and get the wrong answer, quickly. Others continue to
look for alternative models, which, for some syllogisms, will change
the response. All the syllogisms in Table 1 are of this second type.
Individual differences in syllogistic reasoning are greatest in this
type of problem. Those who get these problems correct take longer
on them than people who do not.
In addition to the three original items (F), we included three
similar items (N). Finally, we include some other items (O).
1.6. Overview
We  report ﬁve studies. The subjects were from a panel of about
1200 people who volunteered to do studies for pay over the last
15 years, through advertising, links from various web sites (such as
those dealing with “how to make money on the Web”), and word
of mouth. These were mostly Americans, varying considerably in
Table 2
Overview of questions about the CRT and utilitarianism. “Number” items are scenar-
ios  that pit harmful action to one person against harmful omission to more people.
“Rule” items are those that pit utilitarian against deontological rules. The + and −
signs indicate whether the experiment yielded the expected result or not.
Correlations Study
1 2 3 4
New CRT accuracy, old CRT + + + +
No-lure CRT, old CRT + +
CRT  RT, CRT accuracy + + + +
CRT  accuracy, number items + − −
CRT  RT, number items + − −
CRT  accuracy, rule items + + +
CRT  RT, rule items + − +
CRT  accuracy, utilitarianism scale + − +
CRT  RT, utilitarianism scale + +
age, income, politics, and educational level, but with women  over-
represented. For data analysis, we  relied heavily on the psych pack-
age for R (R Development Core Team, 2012; Revelle, 2012), which
has functions to compute Cronbach’s ˛,  ˛ with each item removed,
item-total correlations (with and without the item in the total), and
factor analysis. We  used the default factor analysis, which used the
oblimin oblique rotation. This made sense for the expanded CRT,
since it would be reasonable to expect items of the same type to
load on the same factor, but we also hoped that these factors would
correlate with each other. The main purpose of the analysis was to
select items that correlated somewhat with each other, and with
the original CRT items, but that also measured different manifesta-
tions of the general trait. We  also used the ltm package (Rizopoulos,
2006) to ﬁt a Rasch model to the data, as we  explain later.
We  also look at correlations between the items and other
measures that could serve as validation criteria. Of primary inter-
est are moral judgments, given that the same sort of sequential
two-system theory has been proposed for some moral judgments,
particularly those that involve conﬂicts between utilitarianism and
other moral rules, as for the CRT itself. We  should emphasize that, as
noted, positive correlations between the CRT and utilitarian moral
judgment have been reported (Hardman, 2009; Paxton, Bruni, &
Greene, 2013; Paxton et al., 2011), but it appears that these cor-
relations are small, not always found, and apparently sensitive to
details of the experiment. We  ﬁnd the same thing: in the studies we
report here, this correlation is sometimes found and sometimes not
found. When it is found, we are interested in what characteristics
of the CRT are most relevant. In the end, we  suggest that the corre-
lation, when found, may  not involve common cognitive processes
at all.
In  Studies 3–5, we use a second validation criterion, a self-report
measure of AOT. We  ﬁnd that items without lures correlate about
as strongly with this scale as do items with lures. These correlations
are robust, unlike those between the CRT and utilitarian judgment.
Table 2 shows some of the overlapping issues addressed by
Studies 1–4. Some of these studies also address some additional
questions, not shown in the table. Studies 3–5 concern additional
correlations involving a measure of actively open-minded thinking
and a measure of belief in divine-command theory, described later.
2. Study 1
This study was in part a conceptual replication of Paxton et al.
(2011). They gave the CRT in connection with a moral judgment
task that assessed utilitarian reasoning. They found that utilitarian
reasoning was  correlated with the CRT, but only when the CRT was
presented before the moral judgment items. Also, when the CRT
was presented before the moral judgments, the judgments were
more utilitarian than when the CRT came after the judgments, as
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if the CRT primed utilitarian reasoning. If we could replicate the
correlational result, then we could use it to validate the new CRT
items.
2.1. Method
This study, in the form of a questionnaire on the World Wide
Web, with each item on a separate page, was completed by 103
subjects (ages 22–69, median 46, 42% male). We  used all 15 items
in Table 1 except O2 and O3, in the ﬁxed order, O1, Bl1–5, Al1–3,
S1–3, Af1–3, all on one page, which was either the ﬁrst page (after
an introduction) or the last. We  also asked subjects if they had seen
Af1–3, but the answer did not correlate with other results. The O1
item (Jack looking at Anne, etc.) was very difﬁcult (9% correct) and
was uncorrelated with the total score of the other items (r = − .13),
so it was dropped from further analysis.
The moral judgment tasks consisted of 8 items of the follow-
ing form. (The items are listed in Appendix A.) The items were
repeated twice in the same order (chosen randomly for each sub-
ject), randomly varying the status-quo.2 Here we discuss only the
mean scores on these items, as correlates of the CRT.
1000 emergency patients in government hospitals will suf-
fer debilitating strokes in the next year. Giving a new drug
to all emergency patients would prevent all these debilitat-
ing strokes but would itself cause 200 debilitating strokes. The
government has decided to give the drug to all stroke patients.
Should the government continue with its plan to give the new
drug to all patients
yes no
What is the largest number of debilitating strokes caused by
the drug that should be tolerated in order to prevent 1000
debilitating strokes?
1000
800
600
400
200
0
This should not be tolerated no matter what harm is prevented
by allowing it.
Consider the long-term costs and beneﬁts of the original pro-
posal. Would the beneﬁts exceed the costs?
yes no
The answer to the numerical questions (treated as an 0–6 scale,
with 6 indicating the maximum (1000 in the example) and 0 indi-
cating “should not be tolerated no matter what . . .”, served as a
measure of omission bias, that is, favoring harms of omission over
less serious or numerous harms of action. Endorsement of the “not
be tolerated” option was taken as a measure of whether the item
was a protected value (PV). By putting it next to the 0, which implied
that none of the designated harm was justiﬁed, we  hoped that
subject would realize that it referred to any harm, not just the
designated harm.
2 In the example in the text, the utilitarian option is the status-quo. The examples
in  the appendix show the alternative option. The status-quo assignment was  ran-
domized for the ﬁrst pass through the items. The second pass simply reversed that
assignment for each item. We found an effect of the status-quo, but it did not interact
with anything else. So we ignore it here and simply combine the two  presentations
of  each item.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Moral judgment
We found no effects of whether the (full set of) CRT items
preceded or succeeded the moral judgment items (thus failing to
replicate Paxton et al., 2011), so we  collapsed across the two  orders.
The relation between the answer to the ﬁrst yes/no question and
the numerical answer served as a test of understanding. Of the 103
subjects, 91 had fewer than 3 out of 10 inconsistent responses, and
81 had fewer than 2.3 For tests of correlations between the CRT and
moral judgment, we  used the group of 91.
For these 91 subjects we  assessed the correlation of the overall
score on the extended CRT with an overall index of moral judgment,
which consisted of the mean threshold measure, standardized
across subjects, minus the mean PV measure, also standardized (so
that the two components were weighted equally). This correlation
was.25 (p = .009, one tailed). The correlation was  signiﬁcant for each
of the two  components separately (r = 0.24, p = .010, for threshold,
r = −0.22, p = .018, for PV). These results conceptually replicate the
correlation found by Paxton et al. (2011).4
In a post-hoc analysis, we  examined this correlation more
closely by predicting the CRT score from each of the possible
moral-judgment responses. Only two correlations were signiﬁcant,
the negative correlation with the response of 0, indicating a PV
(r = −0.22, p = .035, two tailed) and the positive correlation with
the second highest response, which usually indicated the utilitar-
ian optimum (r = 0.31, p = .003). These results are consistent with
the argument that PV responses are unreﬂective (Baron & Leshner,
2000), and the argument that the utilitarian optimum (rather than a
compromise, intermediate, response) would result from reﬂection.
2.2.2. Reliability and correlates of the extended CRT
To score the extended CRT, we  use the number of correct
answers. We also analyzed the data using lures (incorrect answers
that are expected to be intuitive), and the results were much the
same, but we think that the correct/incorrect is the better mea-
sure, for two  main reasons. First, for the belief-bias items we cannot
distinguish incorrect answers from lures, as these items have only
two possible responses, so the results are the same. Second, when
we counted incorrect answers to the two-answer questions (belief
bias) as lure answers, the overall reliability of the correct-answer
measure (.84) was higher than that for the measure based on lures
(.76).
Table 3 shows the item statistics for all 14 CRT-type items. Cron-
bach’s  ˛ was.84, compared to.62 for the original three items. The
“Moral” correlation is the correlation between the item score (1 or
0) and the sum of z scores of the threshold measure and PV mea-
sure for the moral-judgment items (for the 91 selected subjects).
This serves as a check on validity. It is apparent that the syllogism
items in general were not very valid, especially S1, which also had
a low item-total correlation. We dropped the syllogisms in subse-
quent studies. But the belief-bias items were on the whole just as
predictive as the arithmetic items, and this is also true for the RI
measures shown in the same table.
Note also that the correlation of the CRT with sex seems to be
largely due to Af2, the widgets, and the same correlation is found for
its parallel in Al2. The new verbal items do not correlate with sex.
They thus achieve one of the goals of extending the scale. Finally,
3 Six of the 16 judgment items used different consequences for the act and
omission, so this consistency check could not be done. The items with the most
inconsistencies were “virus” and “abortions”.
4 With the full sample of subjects, the ﬁrst correlation was.17 instead of.25,
p  = .047.
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Table  3
Statistics for all the items used in Study 1. Moral is the correlation between the
item  and a composite moral judgment score (z score of threshold minus z score of
PV, removing subjects with more than 3 inconsistencies in the moral responses).
Moral-RI is the same correlation using the reﬂection-impulsivity measure for each
item. R. drop is the correlation between the item and the mean of the other items.
Mean is the proportion correct on the item.
Item Moral Moral-RI Male R. drop Mean
Bl1 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.57 0.50
Bl2  0.10 0.12 −0.09 0.39 0.61
Bl3 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.67 0.55
Bl4  0.23 0.22 0.02 (0.74 0.36
Bl5  0.18 0.13 −0.02 0.23 0.64
S1  0.00 0.11 −0.06 0.16 0.66
S2  0.04 0.24 −0.05 0.33 0.51
S3  0.07 0.21 −0.13 0.33 0.75
Al2 0.14 0.09 0.25 0.45 .68
Al1  0.07 0.05 −0.08 0.23 0.90
Al3  0.26 0.22 0.01 0.59 0.55
Af1  0.21 0.17 −0.01 0.55 0.38
Af2  0.19 0.08 0.25 0.39 0.71
Af3  0.24 0.25 0.03 0.56 0.57
note that at least the belief-bias items are indistinguishable from
the six arithmetic items in validity and item-total correlation.
Fig. 1 shows the results of the factor analysis that captured the
design of the scale best, with 5 factors. These results seem consis-
tent with the goals of the new scale. The factors result from similar
items, and they correlate reasonably with each other.
2.2.3. Response times (RTs)
The sequential two-system theory implies that correct
responses to CRT-type items should take longer than incorrect
responses (at least insofar as the incorrect responses arise from
immediate intuition), other things being equal. This is because
correct responses are assumed to require correction of an ini-
tial intuitive response, and the correction takes time. In order to
test this possibility, we consider an alternative hypothesis about
the determinants of response times. Suppose that the two main
response types (correct and incorrect) were simply in conﬂict, and
each subject had a tendency to choose one type or the other across
problems. Let us call the two types A and B, because we are now
N3
F3
F1
N1
B1
B3
B4
B2
B5
F2
N2
S3
S2
S1
MR2
0.97
0.87
MR40.84
0.73
0.66
MR10.98
0.77
MR30.9
0.87
MR50.730.65
0.59
0.49
0.32 0.42
0.38
0.33
Fig. 1. Results of oblimin factor analysis of the 14 items in Study 1.
thinking of them not as correct or incorrect but just as compet-
ing judgments. Subjects who  tended to choose A would be biased
toward that answer, and likewise for those who tended to choose
B. This bias would manifest itself in choice frequency and probably
also in response time (RT): for a given item, a subject would prob-
ably be faster on the response that is more frequently given to that
item (assuming that it could be presented repeatedly without any
learning). Note that response probabilities would also depend on
the items. Some items would tend to elicit A more than others. For
these items, the response to A would probably be faster, as well as
more frequent, across subjects. This conﬂict hypothesis is consis-
tent with the idea of a race between simultaneous processes leading
to different responses. The faster process usually wins. When the
normally faster process happens to lose, it is unusually slow, so RT
is longer.
This conﬂict hypothesis is of course consistent with many gen-
eral models that explain other response-time results in terms of
the stochastic accumulation of information favoring one response
or the other, until the difference between the two  types of informa-
tion reaches a threshold and the subject responds (e.g., Busemeyer
& Johnson, 2004; Rangel & Hare, 2010; Ratcliff, 1985). In condi-
tions that favor one response, the stochastic nature of the process
sometimes leads to the other response, but the response time will
be relatively long when this happens. A critical point is that, to
test the sequential two-system model, we  need to estimate what
RT would be when response probabilities are equal at.5. The two-
system model implies a systematic difference at this point.
An example in which this kind of conﬂict seems to occur is moral
judgment tasks that use items like those used in this study, except
that the responses are simply yes or no, so that RT can be easily
assessed. The two  response types are utilitarian and deontological.
Baron et al. (2012) argued that these two  types are simply in con-
ﬂict. This view contrasts with an alternative view (roughly that of
Greene, e.g., 2009), which holds that moral judgment often begins
with a quick, intuitive deontological response, which is sometimes
corrected so that the subject gives the utilitarian response. Baron
et al. (2012) distinguish the conﬂict hypothesis from the two-
system hypothesis by looking at patterns of response times. The
point is that the CRT items should ﬁt the pattern predicted by the
two-system hypothesis and not the conﬂict hypothesis.
We can formalize this approach in a way that is sufﬁcient for
our purposes by imposing a Rasch model on the data, as done by
Baron et al. (2012). (We  do not assume that the model fully charac-
terizes relevant processes. Rather, it functions much like everyday
statistical tools.) According to the Rasch model, the probability of a
“correct” response to an item is a logistic function of the Ability of
the subject and the Difﬁculty of the item. Speciﬁcally, P = e
ˇj−ıi
1+eˇj−ıi
,
where P is the probability of a “correct” answer, ˇj is the ability of
subject j and ıi is the difﬁculty of item i. When Ability and Difﬁculty
are equal, so that the difference ˇj − ıi is 0, P is.50. As the differ-
ence increases so that Ability is higher, the probability increases,
with the increase slowing as the probability approaches 1.00; and
conversely for decreasing difference. We  ﬁt the Rasch model to
compute Ability minus Difﬁculty for each response, and then we
examine RT as a function of Ability minus Difﬁculty. (In moral judg-
ment, we deﬁne the utilitarian response as correct, but the model
is symmetric, so it works the same if we deﬁne the deontological
response as correct.)
Fig. 2 shows an example consistent with the conﬂict hypothe-
sis, for moral judgment. Responses are faster when Ability minus
Difﬁculty predicts that they will be more frequent (larger cir-
cles). Note that the two lines slope in opposite directions, as
predicted. Importantly, at 0, where Ability equals Difﬁculty and the
response probability is 50%—the zero intercept for Ability minus
Difﬁculty—the RTs are approximately the same. More graphs like
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Fig. 2. Mean standardized log response time as a function of Ability–Difﬁculty
(scaled and rounded) for Experiment 2 in Gürc¸ ay and Baron (2014). Circle areas
are  proportional to the number of observations in each point; the dashed line and
ﬁlled circles indicates “no” to the utilitarian response; the solid line, “yes”. Across-
subject medians are used because they show the pattern more clearly, but they were
not used in the related analysis.
this one are presented in Baron et al. (2012). Gürc¸ ay and Baron
(2014) report further descriptive and inferential statistics on the
differences of the yes and no intercepts when Ability equals Dif-
ﬁculty for 6 studies, concluding that, while individual dilemmas
might show yes/no differences one way or the other, the intercept
for “yes” is not consistently higher (or lower) than the intercept for
“no”.
To begin to test the possibility that the validity of the CRT is
based on reﬂection-impulsivity (RI), we asked whether (mean log)
RT was positively correlated with utilitarian judgment. The cor-
relation between this RT measure and our main moral judgment
measure was.18 for the selected sample (p = .043, one tailed). The
correlation for the overall RI measure (sum of z scores of RT and
accuracy) with the same moral judgment measure was.28 (p = .003).
This result is consistent with the view that RI accounts for the cor-
relation we ﬁnd, and that the RI measure itself may  be more useful
than accuracy alone. (where r was.25).
3. Study 2
Study 1 found a correlation between the CRT and utilitarian
judgment, but the results from Baron et al. (2012) can be inter-
preted as arguing against any sort of two-system account of the kind
of moral-judgment task used here. In particular, we estimated for
each subject the RT for utilitarian and non-utilitarian responses for
a hypothetical dilemma for which the two responses were equally
likely. At this point of “difﬁculty”, a two-system theory would
predict that utilitarian responses would take longer, because, pre-
sumably, they are generated by a more reﬂective system, whether
this system is evoked as a second step or from the outset. Thus, the
small and labile correlation between CRT and utilitarian judgment
might result from some factor other than within-subject variation
in the use of a slower system-2 process.
Study 2 examines another possibility, namely, that the CRT
correlates with a general preference for utilitarian thinking, which
exists independently of the thinking that goes on in responding
to dilemmas of the sort usually used. More reﬂective people
might have come to favor utilitarian thinking before entering
Table 4
Correlations, Study 2 (  ˛ in diagonals). CRT is accuracy; CRT-RT is log response time;
Uscale is the utilitarian scale; Rules and Numbers are utilitarian responses in the
moral scenarios; and RI is the reﬂection-impulsivity measure, the sum of z scores of
CRT and CRT-RT.
CRT CRT time Uscale Rules Numbers
CRT .86
CRT-RT .28 .93
Uscale .21 .26 .67
Rules .23 .26 .35 .53
Numbers .05 .03 .21 .20 .77
RI .29 .30 .05
One-tailed p-levels:.34 is p = .001,.26 is p = .01,.22 is p = .025,.18 is p = .05.
the experiment. This could happen for many reasons. Possibly
reﬂective thinkers come to utilitarian views through reasoning
about moral situations on their own. Or certain kinds of cultural
environments may  encourage both reﬂective thinking and utili-
tarian morality. We  test this with a short questionnaire intended
to measure utilitarian beliefs directly, shown in Appendix B. (This
questionnaire is reﬁned in later studies.)
In addition, we  test a different kind of dilemma, which we  call
rule-based rather than number-based. The standard dilemmas use
act-omission cases in which the act, which is the utilitarian option,
evokes some sort of negative affective response, e.g., it involves
direct harm. To counter that response, the other option is bolstered
by increasing the quantity of its beneﬁt, e.g., the number of lives
saved. These dilemmas are unusual in two  ways, the reliance on
number, and also the association of the utilitarian option with neg-
ative affect. Baron (2011a) argued that the latter sort of association
may  well be reversed in the real world, with the utilitarian option
usually involving sympathy with those are affected, pitted against
an abstract moral rule. Kahane and Shackel (2010) made similar
arguments. Thus, we  constructed a set of dilemmas based on the
conﬂict between moral rules and utilitarianism, with the goal of
putting sympathy, if not affect in general, on the utilitarian side.
These dilemmas also help to ask whether previous associations
between CRT and utilitarian judgment have to do with the use
of numbers, which are common to both the original CRT and the
standard dilemmas.
3.1. Method
We used the dilemmas from Study 1, along with these new ones,
which are shown in Appendix C. The 20 dilemmas, 10 of each type,
were ﬁrst presented in a random order chosen for each subject. The
CRT items followed in a ﬁxed order: Bl1, Bl2, Bl3, Bl4, Bl5, Al2, Al1,
Al3, L1, L2, Af1, Af2, Af3. Note that the syllogisms were replaced
with two experimental items. They were: “If animals need vitamin
Q, can we  conclude that oysters need vitamin Q?”, and “If oxygen
in the air is poisonous to animals, can we conclude that oxygen in
the air is poisonous to dogs?” Both were syllogisms with a missing
premise, which the subject had to assume: oysters are animals;
and dogs are animals. The ﬁrst did not have an intuitive alternative
answer, but the second went against what we  know is true. As the
data will show, neither item was very useful, but neither was so
useless as to require omission from the data. Thus, although these
were included in the data here, they were not used again.
The study was  completed by the 82 subjects from the same panel
as Study 1 (ages 21–69, median 45, 32% male).
3.2. Results
Table 4 shows the correlations of the various scales. This time,
the CRT correlation with the number items—the same ones used
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Table  5
Statistics for all the items used in Study 2. Uscale is the correlation of accuracy with
the  utilitarianism scale. Rule is the correlation with the rule-based dilemmas. RI
is  the correlation for the reﬂection-impulsivity measure for each dilemma. R.drop
is  the correlation between the item and the mean of the other items. Mean is the
proportion correct on the item.
Item R. drop Mean Uscale Rules RI-Uscale RI-Rules
Bl1 0.53 0.38 0.22 0.20 0.26 0.22
Bl2  0.56 0.43 0.30 0.22 0.38 0.26
Bl3  0.53 0.44 0.15 0.05 0.33 0.11
Bl4 0.63 0.30 0.10 0.18 0.20 0.28
Bl5  0.56 0.49 0.21 0.07 0.30 0.17
Al2  0.50 0.49 0.07 0.13 0.17 0.21
Al1  0.40 0.54 0.14 0.26 0.20 0.37
Al3  0.67 0.44 0.04 0.13 0.10 0.24
Af1  0.58 0.35 0.13 0.19 0.22 0.22
Af2 0.62 0.50 0.07 0.19 0.09 0.19
Af3 0.66 0.46 −0.04 0.03 0.05 0.11
L1  0.21 0.44 0.14 0.06 0.23 0.21
L2  0.31 0.82 0.14 0.07 0.23 0.23
in Study 1 — was absent.5 We  cannot explain this result, although
it is consistent with the general lability of the correlation between
the CRT and utilitarianism.6 However, the CRT did correlate with
the rule-base moral items (Rules in Tables 4 and 5. This is con-
sistent with other evidence that the correlation, when found is
not dependent on number items but rather may  concern belief in
utilitarianism in general (e.g., Paxton et al., 2013). Reinforcing this
conclusion is the correlation between the CRT and Uscale, the new
utilitarianism scale. Once again, RT is at least as useful as accuracy
and that the RI measure is best at predicting utilitarian reasoning.
Table 5 shows the correlations for the individual CRT items. Note
again that item L1 and L2 had low correlations with everything,
although the RI measure for them was still useful (probably because
RT differences are consistent across items, even when the items are
easy). Once again we found that the belief-bias items were as valid
as the arithmetic items.
4. Study 3
So far we have evidence that some aspects of utilitarian think-
ing — which vary from study to study—correlate with an expanded
CRT, which includes belief-bias items as well as arithmetic items.
We also have found that long response times to the CRT are roughly
as valuable as correct answers for prediction of utilitarian think-
ing. It would seem the predictive value of the CRT is that it is a
test of reﬂection-impulsivity (RI). Yet all the items we  have used
so far are constructed to include intuitive answers, like the origi-
nal CRT items. RI measures used in the past (e.g., Baron et al., 1986)
have not been constructed this way. Although some may  have intu-
itive answers that lure subjects into making quick and incorrect
responses, most do not. In Study 3 we ask whether the intuitive
lures are helpful for predicting utilitarian responding. If not, then
the predictive value of the CRT is that it is a test of RI, pure and
simple, and not that it measures any general tendency to be lured
by intuitive answers.
We test this here by using a variety of items constructed so that
they do not have intuitive answers. Examples of these items are
shown in Table 6, with our abbreviations for each type, and the full
set is shown in Appendix D, in the order presented (following the
5 There were only three inconsistent subjects by the criterion used in Study 1, and
removing them did not help. As this criterion was  not relevant to the rule items, we
used all the subjects in the reported results.
6 Although CRT does not correlate with utilitarianism in the number items, Uscale
does.
Table 6
CRT types in addition to original arithmetic items (Al1–Al3 and Af1–Af3).
Arithmetic no-lure (An1–An6) If it takes 1 nurse 5 min  to measure
the  blood pressure of 6 patients, how many minutes would it take
100 nurses to measure the blood pressure of 300 patients?
Belief consistent (Bc1–Bc4), All aunts are sisters.
Some women are aunts.
If  these two  statements are true, can we conclude from them that
some women  are sisters?
Belief neutral (Bn1–Bn4) All laloobays are rich.
Sandy is a laloobay.
If  these two  statements are true, can we conclude from them that
Sandy is rich?
Belief inconsistent (Bl1–Bl9) All bears are ferocious.
Some stuffed animals are bears.
If  these two  statements are true, can we conclude from them that
some stuffed animals are ferocious?
original items). Items labeled A are arithmetic items without obvi-
ous intuitive lures. The logic items are of three types. Bl items are
incongruent belief-bias items like those used before. The truth of
the conclusion conﬂicts with the logic. Bn items are neutral. Because
these items use nonsense terms, there is no truth to the conclusions,
but the logic structure is such as to roughly equate the difﬁculty of
these items with the incongruent items (old and new, see Table 6).
Bc items are congruent, hence with no conﬂict. We  included these
items mainly to make sure that subjects did not simply learn to
give the answer opposite to the truth of the conclusion for every
logic item. For this purpose, we  recommend inclusion of these items
in subsequent research. As it happens, subjects made some mis-
takes on them, and they were somewhat useful for prediction, so
we retained them in our overall measures.
4.1. Method
In addition to the extended CRT scale (Appendix D), we included
the Rule dilemmas from Study 2, before the CRT items, and an
improved version of the utilitarianism scale, after the CRT items
(Table 7). We  removed the last two Rule items to increase reliability,
leaving 8.
Table 7
Revised U-scale. Responses were on a four-point scale. Total score is just the sum
after reverse scoring some items.
When a moral rule leads to outcomes that are worse than those from
breaking the rule, we should follow the rule. (Always . . . Never)
When a moral rule leads to outcomes that are worse than those from
breaking the rule, we should break the rule.
When two  options harm other people in the same ways, we should
choose the option that harms fewer people.
When one option has better effects on some people and worse effects
on  nobody than any other option, then we should choose this option.
When we  can help some people a lot by harming other people a little,
we  should do this.
When one option helps some people and hurts nobody (compared to
any  other option), this option is not always the one we  should choose.
We  should not harm some people in order to help other people. (Agree
.  . . Disagree)
For decision making that affects other people, all that matters is doing
good and preventing harm.
It  is just as wrong to intentionally let someone suffer harm (that we
could easly prevent) as it is to cause the same harm intentionally by
acting.
It  is worse to intentionally harm someone through action than to
intentionally let the same person suffer harm that we could easilly
prevent.
Sometimes we should follow rules that require us to do things that are
harmful on the whole.
Sometimes we should follow rules that prevent us from doing what is
best on the whole.
Some things should not be done even if they lead to very good
outcomes.
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Table  8
Correlations, Study 3 (  ˛ in diagonals), accuracy measures and response times (RT).
CRT CRT-RT Lure Lure-RT Nolure Nolure-RT Uscale Rules
CRT-score .92
CRT-RT .25 .95
Lure .96 .19 .89
Lure-RT .14 .94 .11 .91
Nolure .93 .30 .77 .25 .82
Nolure-RT .33 .95 .24 .80 .39 .92
Uscale .03 .25 .03 .25 .03 .23 .66
Rules  .16 .13 .18 .11 .11 .14 .44 .61
.30 is p = .001 (1 tail),.23 is p = .01,.19 is p = .025,.16 is p = .05.
Table 9
Statistics for CRT items in Studies 3 and 5 (indicated at the end of each variable name): r. drop is the correlation of each item score with all the other items; aot is the Actively
Open-minded Thinking score; uscale is the utilitarianism scale score; rule is the utilitarianism score for the rule-based moral items, and ri indicates the reﬂection-impulsivity
measure (z (time) + z (correct)).
Item Mean-3 Mean-5 r. drop-3 r. drop-5 r. aot-5 ri. aot-5 ri. uscale-3 ri. rule-3
Arithmetic with lures
Af1 0.32 0.36 0.56 0.58 0.07 0.08 0.19 0.09
Af2  0.63 0.51 0.49 0.50 −0.03 0.10 0.05 −0.03
Af3  0.53 0.50 0.68 0.72 0.06 0.09 0.24 0.08
Al2  0.65 0.48 0.45 0.40 −0.12 −0.02 0.20 0.07
Al3  0.53 0.50 0.80 0.65 0.05 0.04 0.26 0.13
Arithmetic with no lures
Al1 0.59 0.68 0.66 0.46 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.08
An1  0.58 0.63 0.77 0.50 0.07 0.19 0.09 −0.01
An2  0.32 0.41 0.50 0.40 0.18 0.22 0.07 0.05
An3  0.20 0.19 0.60 0.54 0.21 0.25 0.13 0.20
An4  0.38 0.46 0.56 0.48 0.26 0.30 0.21 0.20
An5  0.43 0.48 0.62 0.54 0.27 0.22 0.10 0.15
An6  0.27 0.32 0.69 0.69 0.12 0.20 0.18 0.18
Belief  bias with lures
Bl1 0.46 0.41 0.66 0.70 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.15
Bl2  0.59 0.59 0.55 0.61 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.22
Bl3  0.57 0.55 0.62 0.58 0.23 0.32 0.05 0.10
Bl4  0.40 0.41 0.58 0.59 0.21 0.28 0.00 0.15
Bl5  0.63 0.66 0.51 0.51 0.10 0.13 0.26 0.27
Bl6  0.58 0.59 0.63 0.51 0.19 0.24 0.11 0.19
Bl7  0.49 0.48 0.55 0.67 0.12 0.12 −0.04 −0.06
Bl8  0.38 0.47 0.47 0.62 0.17 0.26 0.12 0.24
Bl9  0.30 0.29 0.32 0.23 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.19
Belief  items with no lures
Bn1 0.82 0.81 0.43 0.42 0.13 0.18 0.11 0.01
Bn2  0.90 0.86 0.33 0.32 0.12 0.21 0.11 0.16
Bn3  0.73 0.68 0.34 0.53 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.07
Bn4  0.75 0.83 0.25 0.18 0.14 0.22 −0.09 0.03
Congruent belief items
Bc1 0.87 0.85 0.29 0.23 −0.03 0.11 0.02 0.09
Bc2  0.88 0.90 0.19 0.20 0.10 0.12 0.15 −0.05
Bc3  0.79 0.81 0.11 0.23 0.17 0.22 0.06 0.14
Bc4  0.88 0.88 0.22 0.20 0.02 0.17 0.08 0.12
The study was completed by 104 subjects (ages 23–71, median
45; 39% male).
4.2. Results
Table 8 shows the correlations of the major variables of interest.
This time the CRT did not correlate with the utilitarian belief scale,
Uscale. But the CRT RTs did correlate with Uscale, and (not shown
in the table) the RI measure correlated with both Uscale (r = .18,
p = .036 one-tailed) and Rules (r = .19, p = .030 one-tailed).7
7 To check the classiﬁcation of lure vs. no-lure arithmetic items, we  computed the
proportion of errors to each item that consisted of the single most frequent error
response to that item. The proportions for items previously classiﬁed as lures were:
Al2 0.67; Al1 0.14; Al3 0.76; Af1 0.80; Af2 0.63; Af3 0.78. For the no-lure items the
proportions were: An1 0.30; An2 0.17; An3 0.20; An4 0.25; An5 0.19; An6 0.41. It is
apparent that Al1 is misclassiﬁed as a lure item. Thus, in all analyses, starting with
Table 9 shows the relevant correlations of individual items. It is
clear that the lure and no-lure items overlap considerably in their
correlations with measures of utilitarian reasoning (Uscale and Rule
dilemmas in this study).
In addition, oblimin factor analysis showed that lure and no-lure
items usually loaded on the same factors. Factors were determined
by content rather than whether the items had lures or not, as shown
in Fig. 3 for three factors. Note that all the arithmetic items, lure or
no-lure, loaded on the same factor here.
Finally, Figs. 4 (for accuracy) and 5 (for RT) show the correlations
of lure and no-lure items with each other, for both arithmetic and
belief items. We use tetrachoric correlations for accuracy because
Table 8, we treat Al1 as a no-lure item. Then the proportions do not overlap between
the two  types of items. (In the last experiment, once again, Al1 was lower than some
of  the no-lure items, and re-classiﬁcation removed all overlap.) This change does not
affect any substantive results.
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Fig. 3. Oblimin factor analysis, 3 factors, Study 3.
the accuracy was binary (correct/incorrect) for each item. It appears
from Fig. 4 that belief items with no lures had somewhat lower
correlations with arithmetic items than those with lures, but note
that this is true for both types of arithmetic items (lure and no-lure).
The no-lure belief items were somewhat different from the other
belief items, because they were abstract, and this may  account for
the lower correlations. This difference did not appear to hold for
RTs. In general, it appears that no-lure items correlate with lure
items and with each other (across numeric and verbal types) about
as highly as lure items correlate with each other (across types).
In sum, we found no evidence that intuitive lures matter, either
for reliability or predictive validity of the CRT. The fact that no-lure
items correlate well with lure items suggests that performance on
lure items is not affected by any general trait of sensitivity to lures.
Studies 4 and 5 will provide further tests of these issues.
5. Study 4
Study 4 explores the nature of the correlation between the CRT
and utilitarian judgment. One hypothesis is that the correlation
is mediated by actively open-minded thinking (AOT), so we  used
the AOT scale, which measures beliefs about how people should
think, shown in Table 10. It is identical to the one described by
Haran, Ritov, and Mellers (2013) except that has one additional
item, concerned with search, the last item.
We also examine correlations between the AOT scale and CRT
items with and without lures, although we  did not use the full set
of CRT items from Study 3.
A ﬁnal question concerns the role of religion of a certain sort.
Piazza (2012) and Piazza and Sousa (2013) found substantial
individual differences in the belief that morality consists of rules
Table 10
AOT scale used in Study 4: “Questions about thinking” (  ˛ = .67). Response scale:
Strongly agree . . . Strongly disagree (5 points.)
Allowing oneself to be convinced by an opposing argument is a sign of good
character.
People should take into consideration evidence that goes against their beliefs.
People should revise their beliefs in response to new information or evidence.
Changing your mind is a sign of weakness. (–)
Intuition is the best guide in making decisions. (–)
It  is important to persevere in your beliefs even when evidence is brought to
bear against them. (–)
One should disregard evidence that conﬂicts with one’s established beliefs. (–)
People should search actively for reasons why their beliefs might be wrong.
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Fig. 4. Tetrachoric correlations of individual item accuracy, with shading to indicate the sizes of the correlations, Study 3.
dictated by God, not to be questioned. In the U.S., where most of
his and our subjects come from, this belief characterizes a large
sub-culture, where it is associated with political conservatism
about social issues. We  might also expect that people who have
this kind of belief do not tend to believe in AOT, which they might
associate with liberalism, secular humanism, and agnosticism. If
so, they should get low scores on the AOT scale, and this result was
found by Piazza and Landy (2013). And, if they think according to
their own beliefs about how they should think, they might also get
somewhat lower scores on the CRT. They might, for example, think
that excessive thinking is not very useful. Thus, following Piazza,
we include some questions assessing the belief that morality is
determined by God.
5.1. Method
The study involved 15 moral dilemmas: the 8 best Rule items
from Study 3 (  ˛ = .69, in the present study), plus 7 Number items
drawn from those used by Greene and others (e.g., the studies
described in Baron et al., 2012), but edited (  ˛ = .73). The 15 dilem-
mas  were presented in a random order chosen for each subject.
The Number items were presented in the following format, to make
them more comparable to the Rule items:
X is the inspector of a nuclear power plant that X suspect has not
met  its safety requirements. The plant foreman and X are tour-
ing the facility when one of the nuclear fuel rods overheats. The
emergency coolant system fails to activate, and a chain reaction is
about to begin, which will result in a nuclear meltdown. This will
release lethal radiation into the nearby town, killing many people.
X realizes that the only way  to stop the meltdown is to manually
release liquid nitrogen into the fuel rod chamber.
This will remove just enough heat energy from the rod assembly to
prevent the nuclear chain reaction. However, it will also instantly
kill an employee trapped nearby.
Should X kill the employee in order to save the people in the nearby
town?
Final paragraph on all dilemma pages (Rule and Number):
Some people suppose that there are other options, or that the con-
sequences might be different from what the story says. If you did
this and it affected your answer, please change your answer now,
so that it is the answer you would give if there were no other
options and no additional consequences.
These were followed by a 12-item CRT scale, presented one item
per page in a ﬁxed order: Bl1, Bn1, Bc1, Al2, Al1, Al3, Bl2, Bn2, An1,
An2, Bn3, Bl3 (as used in Study 3).
We  then presented a new version of the Utilitarian belief scale
in two  parts. The ﬁrst part was  similar to the scale used in Study
3. The second part consisted of 5 items taken from a consequen-
tialism scale in Piazza and Sousa (2013). In between the two  parts
we inserted a 4-item religion scale concerning the single point
about whether morality is determined by God, as opposed to being
something that people can ﬁgure out by thinking. The items
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Fig. 5. Correlations of individual item RT (logged), with shading to indicate the sizes of the correlations, Study 3.
Table 11
Correlations, disattenuated correlations above diagonal, raw correlations below it, Study 4. CRTrt is the mean log response time on the CRT items. Uscale is the full utilitarian-
belief  scale. Rule and Number are the dilemmas. Relig is the 4-item religion scale.
Relig AOT CRT CRTrt Uscale ActRule ActOmit
Relig 0.83 −0.817 −0.392 −0.272 −0.808 −0.264 −0.346
AOT  −0.609 0.67 0.530 0.339 0.683 0.417 0.285
CRT  −0.315 0.383 0.78 0.469 0.577 0.323 0.212
CRTrt  −0.237 0.265 0.395 0.91 0.250 0.389 0.104
Uscale  −0.570 0.433 0.395 0.185 0.60 0.318 0.611
Rule  −0.200 0.284 0.237 0.308 0.205 0.69 0.436
Number −0.270 0.200 0.160 0.085 0.404 0.310 0.73
Reliabilities in bold. Raw r = .169 is p = .05 one tailed,.201 is p = .025,.237 is p = .01,.312 is p = .001.
came from Piazza and Landy (2013). The three parts are shown in
Appendix E.
The study was completed by 96 subjects (ages 25–74, median
48.5; 25% male).
5.2. Results
Table 11 shows the main correlations of interest. What is
impressive are the high correlations involving Relig. To empha-
size these we show the disattenuated correlations (corrected for
less-than-perfect reliability) above the diagonal. Of interest are the
correlations of Relig with AOT and Uscale. The (disattenuated) cor-
relation of AOT and Uscale is also high, but it is almost exactly what
is expected if it is the result of both AOT and Uscale correlating with
Relig. These results are consistent with the existence of a causal
effect of religious thinking on both utilitarian judgment.
Correlations of Relig and AOT with CRT and CRTrt are also high,
but factor analysis suggests that CRT is somewhat independent
of the other measures. Results of one such analysis are shown in
Fig. 6. We  shall discuss later the relation between the CRT and other
measures.
Figs. 7 and 8 show correlations between the CRT items used and
the AOT measure. It is apparent that both the lure items and the no-
lure items correlated well with AOT. This is true for both accuracy
and RT.8 And it is true for both arithmetic and belief items.
8 The slightly negative correlation for item Al2 in Figure 8 is apparently the result
of  a couple of outliers.
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Fig. 6. Oblimin factor analysis, 2 factors, Study 4.
6. Study 5
In Study 5, we used the full set of CRT items from Study 3, in
order to provide two additional tests of the predictive power of no-
lure items, and belief-bias items. Recall that, in Study 3, the target
variables involved moral judgment. Here, we use as targets the AOT
scale from Study 4.9
6.1. Method
The study was completed by 101 subjects (ages 19–77, median
43; 28% male). Following an 11-item measure that is not reported
here (see footnote), subjects completed the CRT items from Study
3, in the same ﬁxed order, followed by the AOT scale from Study
4.
6.2. Results
The AOT score correlated with the CRT score (r = .22, p = .015 one-
tailed) and with the RI measure (r = .27, p = .003, one-tailed). The
main results of interest are the correlations of the individual CRT
items, and their corresponding RI measures, with the AOT score.
These are shown in Table 9 along with basic statistics on the CRT.
The results are much the same as in Study 3. Speciﬁcally, the no-lure
items are not distinguishable from the lure items in their correla-
tions with other measures. The same is true for the belief items, as
well as the arithmetic items.
The concept of AOT would be consistent with a disposition to
question initial intuitive answers, as well as with a disposition to
search thoroughly before responding. Yet it seems that the latter
is the main determinant of the relation between the CRT measures
and AOT.
9 We also included an 11-item measure of belief overkill (Baron, 2009). Belief
overkill involves a kind of self-deception in which people bring their beliefs into
agreement with a general conclusion that they favor, even though they could still
favor the conclusion while tolerating some conﬂicting arguments. Our measure of
belief overkill was  experimental, and the experiment failed. The measure, while
somewhat reliable (  ˛ = .58), did not correlate with either AOT or CRT. Subjects did
this  scale ﬁrst.
7. General discussion
7.1. Whither the CRT
Of the items shown in Table 1, all seem useful except for S1 and
O1–3. The verbal items seem somewhat less gender biased. The
reliability of a longer test is higher (as it theoretically should be).
Further, the sampling of different abilities is broader. Importantly,
the belief-bias items are as valid as the arithmetic items in predict-
ing moral judgment and AOT. It follows that shorter forms of this
test can be safely used, so long as they include belief-bias items.
It is somewhat disturbing that abstract syllogisms did not do as
well as the belief-bias items, as the evidence for the role of reﬂection
in correcting initially erroneous responses is quite strong. We  think
that further development of CRT items might try different kinds
of syllogisms (e.g., propositional syllogisms) and different ways of
presenting them (e.g., with all possible conclusions instead of just
three). But the syllogisms used would have to be ones for which the
mental-model theory predicts that multiple models are required.
We do not think that the items we  have used should be set in
stone as any sort of deﬁnitive test. We  think that other examples
of belief-bias items, and others types of items, could perform just
as well. An example of the latter type is the Raven’s Progressive
Matrices test (Raven, Raven, & Court, 2003[2004]). Many items on
the test have lures that look correct but are not.
Ultimately, it is not clear that lures are necessary. The results
we have reported, and many other results, are consistent with an
alternative interpretation, which is that the CRT does not mea-
sure a general trait involving reﬂective suppression of an initial
response tendency but rather a more reﬂective cognitive style,
manifest from the outset of working on each problem. This style is
deﬁned by a greater concern for accuracy than speed. In this way,
the CRT would belong in the class of tests that measure reﬂection-
impulsivity in its most general sense (Baron et al., 1986). Such items,
at their best, show a positive correlation (across subjects) between
response time and accuracy. We  did ﬁnd a positive correlation (for
the entire set of items) in Study 1 (r = 0.21, p = .030), but not in Study
2 (r = − .02). Speed, of course, is also correlated with measures of
general information processing effectiveness.
More tests with no-lure items are needed before these can be
considered fully equivalent to items with lures in their predictive
power. However, our results showing that these items correlate
highly with the items with lures (Figs. 7 and 8) suggest that no-
lure items will indeed work for prediction, especially if RTs are also
measured and a RI score (z(log(RT)) + z(accuracy)) is computed.
In sum, we recommend that researchers regard CRT items as
a general class that can be sampled for any given project. Various
tests can be done on the items used in any given study. We  intend to
do more testing ourselves. We  see no reason not to continue using
items with obvious intuitive answers, even though these seem to
be unnecessary so far.
7.2. Reﬂection-impulsivity (RI) and actively open-minded
thinking (AOT)
The predictive value of the CRT, in the present studies, seems
to result from the fact that it is half of the standard RI measure,
the other half being the mean log response time (RT). A limitation
of our results is that we show this only for two different kinds of
targets, utilitarian thinking and AOT. Moreover, Study 4 shows that
AOT and utilitarian thinking are themselves related, so we  may  be
dealing with only one target, most likely AOT (given that it is easy
to see how AOT could lead to utilitarian thinking but difﬁcult to see
how the reverse could happen).
However, other data support a more general conclusion.
In a study of probabilistic forecasting of international events,
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Fig. 7. Biserial correlations between individual CRT items and the AOT measure, Study 4. Labels are from Table 1 and Appendix D.
Mellers et al. (personal communication) found that individual Brier
scores (measures of accuracy of probability forecasts) were pre-
dicted by items selected from Raven’s Progressive Matrices, an
un-timed intelligence test based on the discovery and application
of rules in visual patterns (Raven et al., 2003[2004]). Many of these
items did have intuitive but incorrect answers, so it is somewhat
analogous to the original CRT and could well be used as a source of
additional items. Of interest is the fact that RT to these items was
positively correlated with accuracy on Raven’s test and with Brier
scores.
Al2 Al1 Al3 An1 An2 Bl6 Bl7 Bl8 Bn1 Bn2 Bn3 Bc1
Co
rre
la
tio
n 
wi
th
 A
OT
−
0.
05
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
Math lure
Math no lure
Logic lure
Logic no lure
Fig. 8. Correlations between RT (log response time) to individual CRT items and the AOT measure, Study 4. Labels are from Table 1 and Appendix D.
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We  have found that the CRT predicts AOT. As we argued, the orig-
inal theory behind the CRT, as the tendency to correct misleading
intuitive responses, is consistent with the idea of AOT. For what-
ever reason, we have failed to ﬁnd any evidence that the overriding
of intuitive responses is relevant to the CRT’s predictive power. Yet
it does correlate with AOT. As implied by Baron’s (1995) results,
we can think of AOT as consisting of two components, one con-
cerned with extensiveness of search (regardless of direction) and
the other concerned with whether search and inference are unbi-
ased with respect to favored conclusions, i.e., their direction. Failure
to search for alternative conclusions could result either from bias
or from too little search, so extensiveness does matter. Measures
of RI seem by deﬁnition to assess extensiveness, the willingness to
think more, in order to increase accuracy. Of course, people who
have this goal are also likely to question their initial conclusions.
(Otherwise, what is the point of thinking more?) Thus, the two  com-
ponents are likely to be correlated, but not perfectly. (Haran et al.,
2013, did ﬁnd that the AOT scale that we used here correlated with
extensiveness of search in a perceptual task.) Because the CRT, and
other RI measures, are not as sensitive to direction as they are to
extensiveness, we think that they should not be used as substitutes
for measures of AOT itself, even though process measures of AOT
are still needed.
7.3. Utilitarian moral judgment
Our results raise further questions about the determinants of
individual differences in utilitarian responding in moral dilemmas.
We did ﬁnd some evidence of correlations between utilitarian
responding and CRT measures. As in previous research, these
correlations are labile and not always found.
Our results suggest that utilitarian judgments arise from a com-
mitment to a utilitarian approach, which exists before subjects
come in to the experiment. People are more likely to adopt this
approach if they are actively open-minded thinkers. (The rea-
sons for this are as yet unclear.) Thus, the tendency to make
utilitarian judgments is not related to careful processing in the
experiment itself, as indicated by the equivalence of RTs when
the probability of a utilitarian response is.5 (Fig. 2). This result
is inconsistent with any sort of two-system theory that implies
that one system is faster than the other. If utilitarian responses
result from more careful thinking, RT would still be higher at this
point, but, as noted, RTs for the two responses are indistinguish-
able.
The results of Study 4 in particular point to why  correlations
between CRT and utilitarian judgment are ever found. The most
likely explanation, at this point, seems to be that they result from
a set of related beliefs about morality and about thinking itself.
A large source of individual differences in our sample—and per-
haps in other samples used for this sort of research—concerns a
set of beliefs about whether people are capable of reasoning about
morality or, alternatively, whether we must accept what we  are
taught without questioning, i.e., without any actively open-minded
thinking about whether it is correct. Such beliefs are explicitly
endorsed in some forms of religious indoctrination, on the grounds
that morality comes from God. People who think this way  about
morality would probably ﬁnd it difﬁcult to think that morality is
an isolated case and that AOT is a ﬁne thing to do everywhere else,
so they get low scores on the AOT scale, even though it does not
mention morality in particular. And, as a result, their own  thinking
may  be somewhat biased and insufﬁcient, even in other tasks such
as the CRT itself.
What does this have to do with utilitarianism? Nothing neces-
sarily. It is possible for a religion to teach that there is essentially a
single moral rule, “Do the most good”, and all else follows from it,
and this rule comes from God.10 Yet, in fact, most moral doctrines
promulgated by organized religions rely on a longer list of rules.
Baron (2011b) discusses how a preference for such rules might arise
in childhood. Yet some sort of utilitarian thinking might be a nat-
ural outcome of a process of open-minded questioning, for many
people. Such a conclusion is at least consistent with the broadest
implications of the two-system theory of moral judgment.
7.4. Intuition and the idea of two systems
The sequential 2-system theory in its various forms assumed a
contrast between intuition and reﬂection, with intuition coming
ﬁrst. We  presented arguments for the relevance of this kind of the-
ory to some domains, such as solving syllogisms. This sort of thing
surely happens, as indicated by ﬁndings like those of De Neys and
Franssens (2009) for the CRT itself. (Their ﬁndings show that it hap-
pens, not that it happens most of the time, and not that it represents
a general trait even across items of the same type.)
What is in doubt from our results is that individual differences
in the disposition to overcome an initial intuition account for the
predictive power of the CRT, and that these differences account
for correlations of the CRT with utilitarian moral reasoning and
AOT. The CRT test may  be difﬁcult in part because the intuitive
answer is available. When people who are not sufﬁciently careful
have it available, they will seize on it and give it as the answer. But
what seems to explain the correlations is not the tendency to over-
come intuition but rather the lack of carefulness, which would lead
to impulsive responding regardless of the source of the incorrect
answer. Our results with no-lure CRT items support this interpre-
tation. Meyer, Spunt, and Frederick (2013) have provided evidence
for other sources of error in subjects who  do not give the lure as
their response.
An alternative account is that individuals differ in their disposi-
tion to rely on intuition from the outset. Those who do rely on it tend
to make judgments more quickly and, when accuracy is an issue,
less accurately. By this account, we  could still call these approaches
“systems,” but people tend to use one or the other. This account can
explain individual differences in the CRT itself, and it can explain
why the CRT correlates with performance in many tasks that are
also sensitive to carefulness. Some additional evidence for such an
account in terms of differences that exist from the beginning of
thinking about a problem comes from a study of Thompson and
Johnson (2014), who found that a measure of AOT correlated with
answers given when subjects were instructed to provide a quick
ﬁrst response, but AOT did not correlate with improvement from
the ﬁrst response to a considered response.
Yet another alternative account is that “intuition,” in some sit-
uations, such as moral judgment, is not a single type of process
across individuals but just a convenient description for whatever
cues people attend to ﬁrst or give the highest weight. These will
depend on the domain and how each person came to think about
that domain, in the course of development. In the domain of moral
judgment, different people will focus on different cues. Even utili-
tarians will vary in the priority that they give to different sorts of
consequences. To study such processes, techniques used to study
multi-attribute choice might be useful (e.g., Coenen & Marewski,
2009; Dhami, 2003). We  might expect people to differ not only
in cue priority but also in the type of processing that they use. At
least when subjects are faces with many cases in the same exper-
iment, some people should discover that a single cue is sufﬁcient,
and sufﬁciently easy to extract from the description, such as the
10 Indeed, Hare (1963) describes the essence of utilitarianism as a “Golden Rule
argument”, and various religious texts argue for some form of the Golden Rule as
central.
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total number of fatalities (for utilitarians, when nothing else is rel-
evant) or the violation of particular rules or laws. If we think of
intuition in this way, then it is what yields a preliminary judgment,
which is often
The correlation between impulsive CRT responding and our AOT
measure suggests that people really differ in their reliance on fast,
intuitive responding, and that these differences are consistent with
their individual beliefs about what good thinking is. In some cases,
it may  indeed be best to rely on intuition, especially when speed is
important, but in other cases such reliance leads to error.
Conﬂict of interest statement
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Appendix A. Morality items used in Study 1
In a war against internal terrorists, A has been trying to kill ter-
rorists and has been bombing buildings where the terrorists are
known to be hiding. The terrorists have started to take refuge in
hospitals. As yet, A has not bombed the hospitals. The terrorists
will kill other non-combatants if they survive. Bombing the hospi-
tals will kill 1000 non-combatants but will prevent the terrorists
from killing 5000 non-combatants themselves. Should country A
start bombing bombing the hospitals?
In a large pharmaceutical factory, a virus has been accidentally
released and will kill 1000 employees. The only way to prevent this
is to give all employees a strong anti-viral medicine, which itself
will kill 200 of them because of its side effects. The management
has not yet decided whether to do this. Should the company put
this plan into effect?
A country is having a serious ﬁnancial crisis. The unemployment
rate will increase from 10% to 20% if nothing is done. The only way
to prevent this is for the government to undertake a massive public
works program, but to pay for this the government must increase
taxes (or else it will have to default on its debt). The parliament will
not allow this. The head of state is considering dismissing parlia-
ment for 20 months. Although the constitution does not allow this,
the army will support this decision. Should he dissolve parliament?
In a small country, 50% of pregnancies end with abortion, and
the government would like to reduce this rate. The only way  to
do this, legally and ﬁnancially, is to increase funding for a family-
planning organization that provides birth control and other medical
services, including abortion. The result will be that the abortion rate
will be reduced to 10% (because of the increased use of birth control
methods), and all these abortions will be done by the organization
that receives the funding. Should the government fund the family-
planning organization?
A guided missile was accidentally ﬁred and is heading for a jet
plane with 500 passengers. The only way to prevent this is for the
air-trafﬁc controller to instruct a smaller plane with 100 passengers
to ﬂy into the path of the missile (without telling the pilot why) and
take the hit. Should the controller direct the smaller plane into to
path?
1000 emergency patients in government hospitals will suffer
debilitating strokes in the next year. Giving a new drug to all emer-
gency patients would prevent all these debilitating strokes but
would itself cause 200 debilitating strokes. Should the government
give the new drug to all patients?
In a certain country, 1000 heroin addicts (out of 100,000) die
each year from accidental overdoses and infections from contami-
nated needles. These deaths can all be prevented if the government
provides all addicts with their daily dose. But, by doing this, the gov-
ernment will discourage some people from giving up heroin and
encourage others to try it. Because of this, the number of heroin
users will be 1000 more than without the government program.
Should the government start the program?
A government has calculated that legalizing cocaine in order to
stop the cocaine trade would prevent 10,000 assaults per year (a
tenth of them resulting in death) but would increase the number
of users from 100,000 to 110,000, an increase of 10,000. Should the
government legalize cocaine?
Appendix B. Utilitarianism scale used in Study 2
1. When a moral rule leads to outcomes that are worse than those
from breaking the rule, we should follow the rule.
Always Sometimes but not always Never
2. When a moral rule leads to outcomes that are worse than those
from breaking the rule, we should break the rule.
3. When two options harm other people in the same ways, we
should choose the option that harms fewer people.
4. When we can help some people a lot by harming other people
a little, we  should do this.
5. When we can help some people a lot by harming other people
a little, we  should not harm the second group of people.
6. When one option has better effects on some people and worse
effects on nobody than any other option, than this option should
be chosen.
7. When one option has better effects on some people and worse
effects on nobody than any other option, this option is not
always the one that should be chosen.
Agree Mostly agree Mostly disagree Disagree
8. For decision making that affects other people, all that matters
is doing good and preventing harm.
9. It is worse to intentionally cause some harm through action
than to cause the same harm intentionally by doing nothing to
prevent it (through some easy action).
10. Sometimes we should follow rules that require us to do things
that are harmful on the whole.
11. Sometimes we should follow rules that prevent us from doing
what is best on the whole.
12. Some things should not be done even if they lead to very good
outcomes.
Scoring was  designed to maximize reliability (  ˛ = .67). One
“item” was the difference item 2 minus item 1; another was  4 minus
5. Otherwise, items 7 and 9–12 were reverse scored.
Appendix C. Rule items from Study 2
1. X is a researcher and a doctor. He is the head of an emergency
room. X has invented a new drug, which promises to undo
much of the brain damage caused by serious head injuries.
It has worked on animals. It has not been approved yet for
humans, because the review board is worried about the fact
that unconscious patients cannot give informed consent.
Meanwhile Joan is brought to the emergency room, uncon-
scious, and alone, with exactly the kind of injury that the drug
could help. Without the drug, Joan has no chance of meaningful
recovery and will be severely disabled. The drug cannot make
her worse, and it might allow her a nearly complete recovery.
The resident in charge of Joan does not know that the drug
has not been approved. The resident asks X if Joan should get
the drug. If X tells the resident to give the drug, nobody will
know. What should X tell the resident?
Give Joan the drug. She might recover from brain damage.
Do not give Joan the drug. She will be severely disabled.
2. X is a manager who must ﬁre 10 employees out of 20 in his
division. The company rules say that X is supposed to choose
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them according to their productivity, but X knows that Y11,
who is ranked 11th in productivity and thus should be ﬁred, is
supporting his parents, who are too old to work and who live
in a country that has no public support for elderly people.
If X ﬁres Y10, who is ranked 10th, instead of Y11, nobody
would know. What should X do?
Fire Y10 and keep Y11, breaking the rules.
Fire Y11, as the rules specify.
3. X is asked to testify for the prosecution at an insider trad-
ing trial. X knows that the defendant is innocent. But other
witnesses have provided damaging testimony in which they
distorted the truth. X also knows that, if he says what he knows,
then the defendant will be wrongly convicted, because X’s
testimony will be mis-interpreted as consistent with the dis-
torted testimony of others. If X says he knows nothing, despite
swearing to tell “the whole truth”, then the defendant will be
acquitted, and nobody will ﬁnd out that X lied about knowing
nothing. What should X do?
Lie, saying that he knows nothing, in which case the court
will correctly acquit the defendant.
Tell what he knows, as he swore under oath that he would
do, in which case the defendant will be wrongly convicted.
4. X is a police detective investigating a major case of embez-
zlement. After a long investigation, he ﬁnds that Arthur is the
culprit, and X has enough evidence to get Arthur convicted,
although X does not know what happened to the embezzled
funds. X then learns that Arthur is dying of cancer and has
only a few weeks to live, although outwardly he looks healthy.
Arthur would like to spend his last few weeks with his family,
rather than in prison awaiting trial. If X destroyed his evidence,
nobody would ﬁnd out. What should X do?
Destroy the evidence, so that Arthur could die with his family.
Follow the law and present the evidence to the prosecutor.
Arthur will spend his last weeks in prison.
5. X is a professor who catches Andrew cheating on a ﬁnal exam in
X’s course. X is supposed to turn Andrew in to the authorities.
In fact, X was on a faculty committee that recently upheld the
principle that all faculty must turn in students. But X knows that
Andrew will fail the course if he is caught, lose his ﬁnancial aid,
quit college and go back to a neighborhood where most of his
old friends are members of gangs and half of them have been
in prison. What should X do?
Admonish Andrew personally but do not turn him in or fail
him.
Follow the rules and turn Andrew in. Andrew will fail and
leave college.
6. X is a nun and an administrator in a Catholic hospital, which
forbids abortion under all circumstances. Without an abortion,
a patient will die and the fetus will also be lost. X knows the
rules about abortion but never thought she would face such a
case. X could allow the abortion. If she did, she would have quit
her job and her order, but she could get a similar job in a lay
hospital. What should X do?
Approve the abortion. The patient will be saved, and she will
be able to get pregnant again.
Follow the rules and disallow the abortion. It is too late for
the patient to move to another hospital, so she would die.
7. X is doing research on depression in college students, using
the Web. She has promised the human subjects committee,
which had to approve the research, to use code num-
bers for her subjects, so that she does not learn anything
about their identity. A computer program assigns the code
numbers, and then puts all identifying information in a
separate data-base. One of her subjects writes a comment
on a questionnaire, saying that he plans to kill himself
tomorrow.
Despite her promise, X knows how to write a computer pro-
gram to recover identity information from the code numbers.
What should X do?
Recover the student’s identity and contact someone close to
the student. The suicide will be prevented.
Keep her promise and do not search for the student’s identity.
The student will commit suicide.
8. X is a doctor. An elderly patient Y has been in constant pain for
months, and nothing seems to help. Y has been begging X to
help him die, for several weeks. Assisted suicide is illegal in the
state where X and Y both live.
But X could give Y a pain killing drug that would also cause
death. X could say it was  a treatment for pain, so that X could
not be convicted of breaking the law. What should X do?
Give Y the drug that would cause death, thus breaking the
law.
Give Y the standard pain-killer, which would not hasten the
patient’s death and would not relieve the pain enough to mat-
ter.
9. A high-school football player John has a broken hand and goes
to X, the only orthopedic doctor in town. X knows that John has
had several concussions and really should stop playing, lest he
get serious long-term brain damage, but John won’t quit, and
everyone else thinks that John should tough it out and keep
playing. The end of the season is approaching, and John would
like to get back into the game. X could insert a pin in the broken
hand, and John would be able to do that.
But X could try to protect John by not mentioning the pin and
just using a cast, in which case John would not play football
for the rest of the season, and probably forever, since John is a
senior. Of course, doctors are supposed to tell their patients all
the options. What should X do?
Put the hand in a cast and not mention the pin. John will not
play anymore, and he will not get more serious brain damage,
but X will not do what he is supposed to do.
Describe the two options to John. John will choose the pin,
play football, and possibly get another concussion, which could
lead to serious long-term damage.
10. X is a doctor doing a shift in a small emergency room when
two  victims of a severe accident arrive. X can operate on only
one at a time, and the victim who  is operated on second will
probably die. X knows that one of the victims is elderly and ill
and was expected to die in a few weeks. The other victim is
young, and likely to live a full life if he survives. What should
X do?
Operate on the younger patient, who  will then go on to live
a full life. The older patient will die.
Flip a coin to decide which patient to save. With a 50% chance,
the younger patient will die and the older patient will live for
a few more weeks.
Appendix D. Additional items used in Studies 3 and 5
The items are listed in the order used, with our abbreviations (A
for arithmetic, B for belief, l for lure, c for consistent logic problems,
n for no-lure), correct answers, and, for logic problems, a formal
description.
Bl6. T “all A are B, C are A, thus C are B”
All things that are smoked are good for the health.
Cigarettes are smoked.
If these two statements are true, can we  conclude from them
that cigarettes are good for the health. (yes/no)
Bn. T “all A are B, C are A, thus C are B”
All laloobays are rich.
Sandy is a laloobay.
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If these two statements are true, can we conclude from them
that Sandy is rich. (yes/no)
Bc1. T “all A are B, C are A, thus C are B”
All business owners are rich.
Bill Gates is a business owner.
If these two statements are true, can we conclude from them
that Bill Gates is rich. (yes/no)
Bl7. F “all A are B, C are B, thus C are A”
All ﬂowers have petals.
Roses have petals.
If these two statements are true, can we conclude from them
that roses are ﬂowers. (yes/no)
An1. 47
A bat and a ball cost 96 cents in total. The bat costs 2 cents more
than the ball. How much does the ball cost? cents”
An2. 120
If it takes 1 machine 10 min  to make 5 widgets, how long would
it take 10 machines to make 600 widgets? min
An3. 46
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch quadru-
ples in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake,
how long would it take for the patch to cover 1/16 of the lake?
days
Bc2. F “all A are B, C are B, thus C are A”
All cats are furry.
Rabbits are furry.
If these two statements are true, can we conclude from them
that Rabbits are cats. (yes/no)
Bn2. F “all A are B, C are B, thus C are A”
All squids like Vitamin A.
Wuzzies like Vitamin A. If these two statements are true, can we
conclude from them that Wuzzies are squids. (yes/no)
Bc3. T “all A are B, some C are A, thus some C are B”
All aunts are sisters.
Some women are aunts.
If these two statements are true, can we conclude from them
that some women are sisters. (yes/no)
Bl8. T “all A are B, some C are A, thus some C are B”
All bears are ferocious.
Some stuffed animals are bears.
If these two statements are true, can we conclude from them
that some stuffed animals are ferocious. (yes/no)
An4. 2.5
If it takes 1 nurse 5 minutes to measure the blood pressure of 6
patients, how many minutes would it take 100 nurses to measure
the blood pressure of 300 patients? minutes
An5. 1.99
Soup and salad cost 5.01intotal . Thesoupcostsa1.03 more than
the salad. How much does the salad cost? dollars
An6. 4
Sally is making sun tea. Every hour, the concentration of the tea
triples. If it takes 6 h for the tea to be ready, how long would it take
for the tea to reach 1/9 of the ﬁnal concentration? hours”
Bn3. T “all A are B, some C are A, thus some C are B”
All mammals are shy.
Some shidos are mammals.
If these two statements are true, can we conclude from them
that Some shidos are shy. (yes/no)
Bl9. F “all A are B, some C are B, thus some C are A”
All wives are married.
Some women are married.
If these two statements are true, can we conclude from them
that Some women are wives. (yes/no)
Bn4. F “all A are B, some C are B, thus some C are A”
All dogs are swimmers.
Some reltas are swimmers.
If these two  statements are true, can we conclude from them
that Some reltas are dogs. (yes/no)
Bc4. F “all A are B, some C are B, thus some C are A”
All ﬁsh are swimmers.
Some Olympic athletes are swimmers.
If these two  statements are true, can we conclude from them
that some Olympic athletes are ﬁsh. (yes/no)
Appendix E. Utilitarian belief scales and religion scale,
Study 4
Utilitarian beliefs (Uscale), ﬁrst part, titled “Choices” (  ˛ = .60).
Response scale: Always . . . Never (4 points)
• When a moral rule leads to outcomes that are worse than those
from breaking the rule, we  should follow the rule. (–)
• When a moral rule leads to outcomes that are worse than those
from breaking the rule, we  should break the rule.
• When two  options harm other people in the same ways, we
should choose the option that harms fewer people.
• When one option has better effects on some people and worse
effects on nobody than any other option, then we should choose
this option.
• When we  can help some people a lot by harming fewer people a
little, we  should do this.
Response scale: Agree . . . Disagree (4 points)
• We should not harm some people in order to help other people.
• For decision making that affects other people, all that matters is
doing good and preventing harm.
• Sometimes we  should follow rules that require us to do things
that are harmful on the whole. (–)
• Sometimes we  should follow rules that prevent us from doing
what is best on the whole. (–)
Items from Piazza and Sousa (2013).
Title: “Morality questions”
Response scale: Agree . . . Disagree (4 points)
• Killing someone can be morally right if it is for the greater good.
• It is always morally wrong to assist people in ending their lives.
(–)
• Torture can sometimes be morally right, if it is for the greater
good.
• It is always morally wrong to have sexual relations with a family
member. (–)
• It is always morally wrong to betray your country. (–)
Religion scale (Relig) (  ˛ = .83)
Under same title (“Morality questions”) without a break.
Response scale: Agree . . . Disagree (4 points)
• The truth about morality is revealed only by God.
• It is possible to live a righteous life without knowledge of God’s
laws. (–)
• Acts that are immoral are immoral because God forbids them.
• We don’t need to try to ﬁgure out what is right and wrong, the
answers have already been given to us by God.
• An atheist can still understand what is morally right and wrong.
(–)
• Without God, humans still have a way  to distinguish right from
wrong. (–)
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